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WHAT DOES THE SENSORY APPARATUS DO WHEN 
THERE IS NOTHING TO PERCEIVE? THE SALIENCE OF 
SENSORY ABSENCE 
 
 
An adequate and exhaustive explanation of the mechanism behind 
perception should cover both typical and anachronous instances of 
sensory acts under standard circumstances as well as in conditions 
deviating from the established norm. Subject to the discussion herein 
should be situations when a perceptual act occurs in the absence of 
sensory stimuli. There is no unequivocal resolution as to what happens 
in consciousness processing the lack of perceivable sensory qualities. Let 
us tackle the problem by sketching two different models of perceptual 
response to the absence of sensory signals. 
The first model: Stimuli fuel the sensory apparatus. Whatever 
cannot be sensed, can be deducted. Inference of the absence of 
sensory stimuli 
The first model stipulates that perceptual activity phases out with the 
shortage of stimuli. Since there is nothing to sense, sensation simply does 
not occur. If nothing excites the receptors, there is nothing to trigger 
sensations. This is, thus, a model that affords a minimal contribution of 
higher cognitive features to perception. Along these lines, the role of the 
senses in recording external environment goes no further than to relay 
the excitation by some form of external energy, be it visible radiation, an 
acoustic wave, etc. Pursuant to the model, there is a straightforward 
answer to the question of the function of the perceptual apparatus when 
there is nothing to sense and physical stimuli fail to achieve the absolute 
threshold required for their detection by the sensory receptors. The 
solution is: perception does nothing. Perception is restricted to the 
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registration of positive sensual qualities. However, since consciousness 
still stands or rather its stream briskly flows onwards even in the idle 
mode of the sensory functions, it remains to be brought out where the 
awareness of lacking sensory qualities resides if perception is not the one 
to grasp gaps in the incoming cascade of signals from ambient 
environment. This point undermines the model. The above line of 
reasoning proves the reaction-dependent model of sensory experience 
to be discriminatory in the sense that successful perception occurs only 
under steady external input. The model’s explanatory power dissolves in 
the absence of positive sensory qualities. In order to restore credibility 
to the model, the lack of sensory qualities would have to be attributed 
directly to the subject. If there is nothing to see, this unperceivable 
absence cannot be referred to anything in the outside world and it is 
inherited by the subject herself. But can we defend the contention that 
the lack of sensory signals may be construed to fall within the domain of 
sensory experience? Under the conjecture that vision ends when there is 
no more to see another sensory faculty would have to take over, with 
proprioception being the only candidate left on the battleground. 
Ludicrous as it sounds, all missing components of experience would have 
to be considered as forged by proprioception. This would further lead to 
the conclusion that darkness or silence would be detected by inner sense 
organs and would belong to a different category than positive visual or 
acoustic sensations. Such an assumption cannot be upheld. Under the 
restrictions of the model, the absence of a specific type of sensory signals 
invokes higher cognitive faculties. You cannot see darkness or hear 
silence but there is no obstacle to inferring that darkness or silence is 
around. This model postulates an interventionist role of higher cognitive 
faculties with respect to sensory experience as they step into action only 
when lower level faculties face resistance. The model seemingly ascribes 
higher autonomy to the non-sensual component of experience but it 
invites confusion as to why abstract thinking and other forms of 
discursive operations can only be at stand-by under standard perceptual 
circumstances. The adoption of the model requires acknowledging a 
discrete, intermittent mode of operation of higher cognitive faculties in 
the perception channel as it is their task to ensure the continuation of 
perceptual activity upon a gap in the influx of sensory signals. The 
shortage of external stimuli may only be conceived of in abstract terms.
 [44] 
This brings us to the crux of the conceptual unease spawned by 
the reaction-only model. Granted that missing stimuli, regardless of their 
sensory channel, equal non-perception, it is unclear on what basis the 
subject could discriminate between the respective commonly identified 
types of perceptual absence. Now the lack of acoustic signals seems very 
conspicuous and has been dubbed silence, whereas the scarcity of visual 
stimuli goes by the name of darkness, the dearth of flavor is nowhere 
near the unavailability of odor. Zero gravity feels differently than an 
interruption in the flow of tactile sensations. There also exist states that 
do not readily yield to categorization, such as painlessness that seems 
devoid of specific constituent features. Is there a model that would do 
justice to the variations of missing sensory qualities? Conscious 
interpretation of the state of deactivation of  sensory receptors must be 
revisited in further models. 
Let me make one explanatory remark before it is contested that 
receptors are fueled by some form of energetically pumped signals from 
the outside. No matter what the actual neural activation pattern is, what 
I shall refer to as a receptor for the sake of this text should be scaled down 
to whatever organelle, substance, or structure that directly undergoes 
stimulation and absorbs the energy. It might not always be a cell. Even 
though photoreceptor cells, such as rods and cones, may undergo 
inhibition when hyperpolarized by light and release neurotransmitters 
when not hit by radiation, it does not challenge the fact that either there 
is external input or there is none. Confusion may only arise if we fail to 
clearly delineate what we mean by a receptor. 
A counterargument against full dependence of perception on 
external stimuli stems from the consideration of the conceptual 
distinction between the inability to take in a specific type of stimuli, such 
as deafness, and the recording of a state conspicuous for the lack of 
signals from the environment, such as silence. Now the difference 
disappears if no line is drawn between sensory perception, activation of 
a sensory organ, awareness of the existence of a specific type of 
sensations, and the actual presence of a definite type of sensory stimuli 
in the environment. Some researchers point to the fact that we are often 
at a loss as to whether we have just forfeited hearing or silence has fallen 
until we are exposed to further acoustic stimuli. (Sorensen 2008, s. 2). A 
common denominator of these states is surely the lack of signal from the 
auditory organ. But what is salient for the conscious subject is not so 
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much the fact that nothing is to be heard, but why it is so. The source of 
disturbance in the reception of acoustic stimuli is what matters in terms 
of survival and effective action. The organism should discriminate 
between its own sensory failure and a null level of the intensity of a 
specific type of stimuli. The explanatory and discriminatory futility of the 
model is manifested by the unavailability of a clear distinction between 
deafness and the sensation of silence. 
This calls for a recasting of the posed question concerning the 
function of the perception of sensory qualities in terms of external world 
representations. The outside world is not out there for the sake of being 
subject to perception. Perception serves for the organism to stay a part 
of the world and survive by navigating within it. Not only what stimuli 
impinge on the sensory organs is of significance. Of equal or far 
surpassing importance is to determine why exactly their influx has 
stopped. The recognition of perceptual absence falls short of the task of 
staying alive unless the context of the omission is embraced. We can, by 
all means, speak of a continuous sensory deprivation of a person 
suffering from an irrevocable loss of specific sensations in the wake of 
damage to either sensory organ, neural path leading to the brain, or the 
respective cerebellar area itself. It may be doubted, however, that it is 
sound to claim that such a person is constantly exposed to silence. She is 
deprived of acoustic sensations on equal terms with a person with intact 
hearing but staying in a completely soundproof room. However, it is a 
transient experience for the latter person who expects a deluge of 
acoustic signals once she leaves the room. It shall not be an 
overstatement to claim that such a person hears silence, whereas the 
deaf person, in fact, fails to hear. The state of missing sensory qualities 
does not only represent physical reality but is also crucial for a successful 
interpretation of the course of events. 
The advocates of representationalism in the treatment of the 
status of conscious experience, such as Michael Tye, could repeal the 
objection concerning the lack of a representationalist component of 
silence or darkness by contending that such a component is indeed 
present and corresponds to the idleness of respective sensory organs. In 
effect, a sensation of silence or darkness would carry information 
pertinent to the state of sensory organs and not to the absence of 
phenomena in outside reality. (Tye 2003, p. 166) If we were to be 
consistent, however, we would have to assume on this view that we 
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exclusively perceive the states of sensory receptors both upon their 
excitation and upon deactivation, never reaching out deeper into the 
outer world. This would compromise the very concept of sensory 
perception. We perceive in order to navigate outside environment. If 
sensory perception is to retain its rationale, it should represent external 
reality and not the states of stimulation of sensory organs. 
It seems, however, that a representation generated without the 
contribution of an external factor and designed exactly to stand for its 
absence may only be construed broadly as spanning a wide fragment of 
reality. A singular simple sensation appears to be ineligible for 
representing missing impingement of the environment on a specific type 
of sensory receptors. Only a non-atomistic, complex, manifold 
representation may render the deficiency of a chosen quality. The 
corollary is that there is no representation of silence, or darkness, or any 
other lacking sensation at the level of the sensory apparatus, and its 
identification requires the comparison of two representations, one 
sound-laden, the other - soundless. On this view, silence as a separate 
individual aspect may not be represented by the receptors. Although the 
initial state of missing stimulation is identical in the case of both sensory 
deprivation and the absence of sensory stimuli, brain-level 
representations may vary.  
We reach the heart of the problem at this point. It seems fully justified to 
claim that silence may be heard. It must have the status of a sensation in 
order to fulfill its dedicated function. How to reconcile the status of a 
representation of the external environment with a full-blown sensation 
in case of negative sensory qualities? Is it possible that sensation is not 
confined to the domain of sensory organs? To what extent is the brain 
privy to the birth of sensory experience and how much does it conspire 
in the way the world seems to us? In what sense is the brain an 
accomplice in the formation of sensory experience and not only its 
recipient? 
How far can we take the contention that the absence of sensory 
stimuli does not translate into the lack of experienced sensations but 
constitutes a separate type of perception?  How are we to interpret the 
fact that sensory void is accompanied by perceivable neural correlates, 
negative sensory qualities? Silence does not stand as a state of 
completely damped acoustic stimuli. On the contrary, it designates a 
specific sensation, divergent from deafness in a constitutive way and not 
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only genetically, by dint of its cause. The analysis of the phenomenon of 
darkness approximates exactly such an account in the sense that 
darkness may be counted among other sensations. It was  Aristotle who 
already identified darkness with black, i.e., one of three achromatic 
colors alongside with white and grey. Modern explanation of the 
sensation of black does not depart from the original ancient finding, and 
it is thought to be the response of the visual apparatus to the lack of 
electromagnetic waves in the visible bandwidth (Hurvich 1981, p. 61). 
The bottom line is whether a theoretical backdrop may be developed 
wherein sensory experience would be traceable to higher cognitive 
faculties. 
The first model is not to be pronounced doomed altogether. What 
should be questioned is its pertinence to conscious perception. However, 
the model holds true for sensory receptors, adequately capturing their 
function, which consists in the detection and differentiation of stimuli. 
Without the perceptual apparatus in place, there is no point in tracking 
the emergence of sensory experience. But episodes when external 
stimulation discontinues do not involve sensory cell excitation. It is not 
the receptors that record the lack of sensory qualities. Negative sensory 
states are detected based on the absence of the output from sensory 
organs but they are identified only at higher level cerebellar structures. 
It remains to be determined at exactly what level. The analogy between 
senses and sensors that indeed record both positive and negative states 
of a chosen aspect of the environment - collapses. These devices operate 
in a binary way. This is their intended use. In the case of complex 
organisms such as ourselves, we may safely assume that it is the central 
nervous system that serves as the recording and storage medium of the 
unavailability of specific sensory qualities and not the subordinate 
sensory organs. A substantiation is called for at this point that the 
discussion concerns the lack of sensory stimuli and not the exclusion of 
a sensory aspect from the scope of attention. Sometimes, the 
disappearance of a sensory quality, what can and cannot be seen or 
heard, is not due to the actual state of the external environment, nor the 
dysfunction of receptors, nerves, or the respective information 
processing areas in the brain, but other global brain mechanisms 
impacting conscious thought. A varying share of awareness may be 
apportioned to distinct inputs, depending on their salience. Even a 
distinct sound may fall beyond the scope of consciousness if it becomes 
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too monotonous a signal for the brain to bother. Maybe, we only grasp 
the transition from an environment bathed in acoustic waves to silence, 
with the outcome being that we are only aware of changes. (see 
(Maruszewski 2001, pp. 62–67)) The absence of a conscious sensation 
does not necessarily mean sensory stimuli have failed to occur. This 
higher-level selectivity of perception has come to be called attention. It 
may well be just another side of perception. (Lupyan, Clark 2015, p. 282) 
What I address in this paper are the episodes when the lack of stimuli is 
in the focus of attention. 
Feedback perception model: Reversal of the order of sensory 
perception. Perception as a continuous process of forecasting the 
environmental inputs by higher cognitive faculties assisted by the 
perceptual apparatus upon a mismatch of the top-down prognosis 
and the actual state of the matter 
To address the second model we must revisit the heretofore introduced 
category of representation. Allow me to add that this applies to a 
representation at the level of neural tissue, regardless of the exact 
mechanism behind the coding (internal neuron composition, global 
cerebral reach of select neural connections, specificity of neural 
synapses, oscillations of electromagnetic waves at a specific frequency 
inside the brain, etc.) While this point is beyond the scope of this study, 
let me note in passing that the very claim and subsequent evidence that 
a fraction of the world, namely, the brain, carries a host of finely 
structured hierarchical neural representations of the world beyond and 
within the body (inner bodily affairs) poises us to discard the now 
redundant stipulation of a supplementary category of mental 
representations. If neural representations are forged through interaction 
with the world itself in a succession of generations, the mind need not 
internalize the world again. 
In the discussion herein it is assumed that the senses consistently 
respond to specific types of external stimuli. This condition trivially 
assures the effectiveness in representing the environment. A stimulus of 
type X always invokes a reaction of sense a, while stimulus of type Y 
always triggers the response of sensory function b. It is pointless to ask 
about accuracy in representing the environment as access to physical 
reality is granted via the senses and higher cognitive faculties, so there is 
no external point of reference. As long as sensory experience ensures 
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survival and effective action, it may be considered that experience is 
indeed accurate – in a trivial sense. The more faithfully the structures and 
functions of the organism encode the external considerations, the higher 
the odds for survival and evolutionary success. The accuracy or 
correspondence of experience to the ambient environment, the 
resolution of this mapping, is the work of evolution and factors shaping 
neural machinery through the succession of the forms of life. It may be 
worthwhile to recast the assessment of experience in terms of precision. 
The question is not whether the representation of external reality in 
experience is true, but if it holds relevance. The precision of experience 
would consist in such an attunement of senses to the environment that 
they would serve not as signals for detection and interpretation but a 
clear call for action. Imagine a sensory landscape in need of further 
thorough processing, providing a complex map to be read according to a 
detailed legend.  Such a far removed sensory interface with the world is 
possible to navigate but hardly effectively. It lacks immediacy. A much 
better design would allow us to read signals from the world as signposts 
and warning alerts that are readily actionable. 
While the accuracy of representation is granted, precision may be 
perfected also throughout individual development, by means of practice. 
What is more, precision only makes sense in terms of an organism's 
interaction with the environment. Passive staring at an object fails to 
serve a specific purpose and hence it does not fulfill the criterion of 
fitness. It is far from being a representative example of an organism’s 
activity. What organism is solely engaged in perception? Perception 
usually accompanies intricate movements, keeping balance under 
challenging conditions, compensation of undesirable shift of the center 
of gravity through the flexion or extension of extremities, complex 
manipulation of objects.  Its natural settings are those of motion and 
relocation of the organism within its environment. Organism herself fine-
tunes her senses – through rearrangement of bodily location, posture 
and gestures, eyeline shift, etc. Perception is not available in a read-only 
mode, it is an editable interface with the external world. 
Such a conception renders it impossible for experience to be born here 
and now only to be reborn a moment later, in every single instant of 
conscious life. Should it be that way, the subject would be constantly 
engaged in perception alone. If experience seems seamless and appears 
to carve the world at its joints, it must have been finely sculpted by the 
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cognitive machinery of the brain in the course of evolution. Its close 
alignment with external reality comes as no surprise. It has emerged in 
conjunction with reality. To represent the external environment, 
experience does not have to reproduce it each and every time, as it is 
reality’s own extension, and reality has guided its formation and 
contributed to its development. 
A question springs to mind: since the brain builds the image of 
reality so precisely, why does the organism ensure the constant activity 
of the senses? The image of reality (Clark 2015, p. 3) cascades with top-
down traffic of forecasts and requires only some adjustments of the 
senses in case of a deviation from the prognosed flow of sensations. Alas, 
I have not authored this model. One of its advocates is Andy Clark, and 
the model is dubbed embodied predictionism. On this account, the brain 
is a prognostic device projecting the expected train of events amid the 
stream of sensations. Higher cognitive faculties bear the brunt of the 
burden and their projections are only so much as validated by the signals 
from the sensory receptors (Clark 2015, p. 5). Hence, most of the receipt 
of sensory signals occurs below the threshold of awareness. It is only 
upon a prognostic error that the senses come to the surface of 
consciousness and the direction of cognitive processing is reversed from 
receptors to higher brain areas. The tightly-knit frame of expected 
experience readily accommodates a direct sensation, the operation of 
external stimuli themselves. Errors in the prognosis of unfolding 
experience provide a window onto external reality. Under normal 
circumstances, which also explains why it seems to be the standard, the 
forecast conjectured by higher cognitive faculties prevails, undisturbed 
by perceptual discrepancies. 
I have sketched the theory of predictionism. It is now time 
embodied predictionism is put to the test in the context of the lack of 
sensory stimuli. 
How does this theory account for the perception of missing 
sensory stimuli? Let’s reframe the question in more detail. It goes 
without saying that an exclusive comprehension of individual negative 
sensory qualities gives rise to a cognitive discord. Imagine an attempt to 
narrow down all sensory channels to just the receipt of the absence of, 
let’s say, sounds. How could you possibly experience solely silence or 
contemplate deafness with the attenuation of all other sensations? That 
said, the reconciliation of a single missing type of sensory quality with 
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the overall representation of a vast momentary perceptual landscape 
invites few objections. The sensory repertoire seems richer and is not 
limited to singular qualities. A collective perceptual act of a full sensual 
stage, albeit deprived of acoustic or visual sensations, occurs commonly 
and allows to avoid the paradox of directly seizing something that isn’t 
there. In a further step, also forecasting such rich multi-ingredient 
sensory vistas, devoid of individual types of sensory qualities, satisfies 
all criteria of credibility. It is clear that a conscious subject shall expect 
darkness at night and shall not be surprised by the fact that there is 
nothing to excite her rod and cone cells. Except perhaps for a lone 
photon. 
What seems counterintuitive and requires a thorough theoretical 
analysis is the defense of the embodied account of perceiving the lack of 
sensory qualities. Here, embodied predictionism encounters a true 
challenge and opportunity for deploying the depth of its explanatory 
potential. Negative sensory qualities may be represented, they may also 
be predicted. But will they succumb to the account of embodiment? The 
idea behind embodiment rests on the deliverance from the need to build 
a succession of finely detailed models of the world in individual instants 
of experience for the sake of putting in place a stable precise 
representation of the external environment in the brain as well as 
interaction with reality. A simpler, less challenging explanation of the 
conformity and convergence of the actions undertaken by conscious 
creatures and the actual state of the matter indicates not as much an 
incredible ability to seamlessly represent outside reality as the 
involvement of reality itself in the workings of the sensory apparatus. 
Neither at the receptor level nor at the level of higher brain structures is 
there room for a real-time, ongoing strict mapping of the world at a 
suitable resolution. However, there is room for a matrix of probable 
responses and the selective activation of this matrix causing specific 
sensations. The senses and higher brain areas need not elaborate 
baroquesque world representations in each fleeting moment. Rather, an 
evolution-licensed cognitive template is set against the ambient 
circumstances and only interferences must be accounted for, if there are 
any. Thus construed, perception is an interplay with the world and not 
an act of collecting inputs to be encoded so that other parts of the brain 
may unpack them and process them further. The organism takes 
advantage of a sophisticated matrix corresponding to the outside 
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environment that forecasts the unfolding of experience. It is none other 
than the brain along with its integral neural correlates of phenomena 
(Clark 2015, p. 4). Since the bulk of sensory details comes from our own 
prognostic-representation machine, should there emerge an 
inconsistency between the forecast and the actual stimulus, the subject 
is poised to stand face-to-face with a single sensory stimulus, something 
unthought-of in traditional representationalist work where all 
perceptual interactions were considered to be heavily mediated 
(Feldman&Friston 2010,p. 2). An interference with the prognosis makes 
a direct appearance in consciousness, rather than being passaged via the 
entire convoluted interpretation and decryption pipeline of perceptual 
brain areas, which would impair immediacy. To ensure the readiness of 
capturing a random element gone against the strain of the top-down 
forecast, the influx of stimuli must be met with an equally complex 
correlate so that no other detail burdens the processing channels but this 
one outlier. Another prerequisite is the active manipulation of this 
correlate against and within outer environment – through motion, 
adjustment of bearings, etc. This is what embodied cognition is all about. 
The organism may incessantly tweak its vantage point, by tilting the 
head, moving around in space, squinting eyes. This makes sensory 
cognition a dynamic and multidimensional act. Perception does not 
occur statically, we do not come to learn about the world from aloft, from 
the position of a remote observer, but from the inside. The senses do not 
have to simulate the external world as their calibration with the world 
occurs in real time through actual motion, adjustment of posture and 
bodily position in space against external objects. 
How are we then to interact with something that isn’t there? The 
subject must deploy a model of states of sensory deprivation. But such a 
model indeed exists and is inscribed in the brain structures. There is thus 
no need for the cognitive functions to form a representation of negative 
sensory qualities on each individual occasion. Under the assumption that 
the subject is equipped with rich resources representing the world of 
which it is an extension, amassed through long-term exposure of its 
ancestors and itself, the paradoxicality of the experience of sensory 
absence is dissolved. It remains a fact that if no acoustic waves reach the 
environment, there are no visible electromagnetic waves to occur, there 
are no tactile stimuli, sensory cells stay idle. The respective types of 
sensory deprivation may not be encoded at the level of sensory receptors 
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as it is precisely them that are not involved in the least. But they are not 
the carrier of consciousness, and the brain that takes advantage of their 
machinery by no means succumbs to idleness. After all, it manages to 
determine with precision what sensory cells fail to evince activity. The 
mechanism behind this relies on the same principles that account for 
external excitations triggering respective responses at the level of 
conscious experience. If specific neurons fall silent, isn’t it a sufficiently 
clear signal to release an appropriate sensory response? Why shouldn’t 
gaps in the flow of a specific type of sensory qualities be interpreted as 
direct experience? If the elaborate correlate of external reality covers 
also negative sensory qualities, why shouldn’t the subject detect the 
absence of specific stimuli in the environment under suitable 
circumstances? Directly. The lack of sensory qualities does hold the 
status of experience. It is the subject herself that integrates such qualities 
into the image of reality even though they are absent in the environment. 
In this respect, the subject’s repertoire of sensory qualities exceeds the 
one available among external stimuli. We may indeed see darkness. 
The account of embodied predictionism strives to demonstrate its 
empirical viability. Much as a raft of evidence has been submitted in favor 
of the soundness of predictionism (see, e.g. Friston 2011), embodiment 
is yet to be demonstrated more thoroughly in empirical settings 
(although a body of relevant studies exists - see Beer 2000, p. 97; 
Glaescheri et al., 2010, p. 585 ). In pursuit of research methodology and 
an empirical trial of the theory, let us resort to a thought experiment. 
Let us consider a unique situation of a person with a condition fit 
to be called „negative synesthesia”. Such a person manifests sensitivity 
to all sensory stimuli that invoke a conscious response in a human being 
adequately equipped for her species. It, therefore, comes as no surprise 
that this person can also properly identify the lack of stimuli of any type. 
The specificity of perception in such a person consists in that the 
sensation of silence is accompanied by a visual experience of darkness, 
the deficiency of tactile stimuli leads to the feeling of odourlessness, etc. 
We could point out all the feasible ways the senses may interfere with 
one another, according to the principles of combinatorics, but let me 
leave it at the examples provided. Now let us now turn to the thought 
experiment. Let us assume that a negative synesthete enters a dark room 
reverberating with the chords of the piece Kind of Blue by Miles Davis. 
The hapless gal recognizes in the sequence of sounds one of her favorite 
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musical compositions but acoustic bliss is spoiled by the ambient 
darkness that she is susceptible to experiencing as silence. The cognitive 
state of a negative synesthete may be preliminarily described as that of 
dissonance. Contrary to visual and acoustic illusions and other standard 
cases of paradoxical perceptual acts, such as the detection of motion in a 
static drawing, or the attribution of various dimensions to objects with 
identical size due to the impact of contextual cues on the interpretation 
of sensory data, or hearing ever rising tones in a repeated sequence of 
music, negative synesthesia does not result from some kind of a conflict 
in higher level processing of sensory information and applies to baseline 
sensory qualities. It should be noted in passing that impairment of one of 
the senses usually causes the amplification of the function in others. The 
very phenomenon of negative synesthesia is thus scarcely probable in  
nature. It may, however, aid the discussion herein. How can you hear 
silence in the accompaniment of acoustic sensations? In the light of a 
standard model of bottom-up sensation, whereupon signals ascend from 
the receptors to brain areas without significant feedback from the brain, 
the receipt of sound stimuli excludes a sensation of silence. This is one 
and the same sensory channel. An analogous regularity pertains to all 
other sensory modalities. Please bear in mind that under this model two 
allegedly conflicting experiences occurring in the same sensory channel, 
i.e., the sensation of silence and audible tones of the melody Kind of Blue, 
belong to two separate orders. On the one hand, the representation of 
silence forms due to atypical stimulation of perceptual brain areas. On 
the other, the latter experience emerges as acoustic waves impact the 
sensory cells of the hearing apparatus. The paradoxicality of the 
experience of silence in the accompaniment of music dissolves if 
contradictory sensory components are assigned to disparate categories. 
The disintegration of sensory consistency is at its highest in case of 
negative synesthesia, with the model of bottom-up perception failing to 
rule out such a possibility. 
Whereas on the grounds of predictionism, neural correlates also 
feature the representations of negative sensory qualities. It is thus 
possible for the brain, busy with forecasting the course of experience, to 
collate them with positive sensations. In principle, the case of negative 
synesthesia makes sense under the model of perception woven by the 
prognostic brain machinery, faced with the actual inputs of sensory 
stimuli. It remains an open issue what combinatorial algorithm could 
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serve for the cognitive apparatus to merge the tissue of experience. What 
would be the reaction of a brain identifying darkness with silence and 
simultaneously exposed to acoustic stimuli in a darkened room? Would 
a negative synesthete hear a hushed melody? Perhaps a negative 
synesthete would enjoy a full-bodied auditory sensation only in a well-lit 
room with light-colored walls and equipment, and she would encounter 
hearing difficulties in dimmed lighting? Before we delve into far-fetched 
speculations, let us evoke the temporarily disregarded aspect of 
embodiment. Predictionism in its own right fails to undermine the 
feasibility of negative synesthesia. Will embodiment prove more 
restrictive? Negative synesthesia implies that each occurrence of missing 
sensory stimuli would be accompanied by total sensory deprivation. 
However, with the emergence of the first tones of Kind of Blue the brain 
should align the feeling of severance from the signals from the outside 
world and reinterpret it as irrelevant to the auditory channel.  Since 
hearing receptors detect acoustic waves, there is no room for the 
sensation of silence in the organism’s cognitive economy. It is the 
external environment itself that serves as the referee in all unequivocal 
perceptual scenarios. The non-neurotypical brain structure of a 
synesthete may invoke the sensation of silence in response to the lack of 
visual stimuli, but further interaction with the environment and the 
intake of reverberating sounds should dismiss the unsubstantiated 
experience of silence. Whenever anything deviates from the prognosis, 
the subject witnesses the making of perception. The absence of 
observations of behaviors indicative of the hypothetical phenomenon of 
negative synesthesia comes as no surprise and serves as evidence in 
favor of embodied predictionism. 
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ABSTRACT 
WHAT DOES THE SENSORY APPARATUS DO WHEN THERE IS 
NOTHING TO PERCEIVE? THE SALIENCE OF SENSORY ABSENCE 
This study aims to bring out the explanatory potential of embodied 
predictionism versus passive feed-forward model of sensory stimulation 
in the pursuit of a parsimonious naturalist account of sensation as a 
salient feature and an end point of conscious experience. Theoretical 
approaches towards sensory experience are tested against specific 
scenarios of the absence of observable or palpable qualities including but 
not limited to the thought-experimental phenomenon of negative 
synesthesia at the conclusion of the argument. . Predictionism is first 
explored in its own right only to be found insufficient to do justice to the 
actual mechanism behind full-blown immediate perception. A case is 
made for the soundness of predictionism reconciled with the doctrine of 
embodiment. 
KEYWORDS: embodied predictionism; representation; embodiment; 
sensory deprivation; absence of sensory stimuli; sensory perception 
 
